Most drivers owe the people around them ordinary care. A bus owes its passengers more. The law’s word for a business that carries the public is common carrier, and the word raises the standard.
The definition. A common carrier is in the business of carrying passengers and goods and holds itself out for hire by the public (VIA Metropolitan Transit v. Meck, Tex. 2020). The test is what the business does; in Meck the Court looked to the authority’s primary function, providing transportation to the general public for a fee. In the same opinion the Court noted an earlier holding that the operator of a speed-boat ride was not a common carrier, because its “primary purpose is to entertain, not to transport from place to place.”
The standard. A common carrier owes its passengers a high degree of care. It must act as “a very cautious and prudent person” would act under the same or similar circumstances; in the jury charge in Meck the phrase was “a very cautious, competent, and prudent person.” An ordinary driver owes ordinary care. The common law has long spoken of “three degrees or grades of negligence”: gross, ordinary and slight. Because the carrier owes a high degree of care, it can answer for what the law calls slight negligence. It is not a guarantee. The duty does not make carriers “strictly liable as insurers,” and it does not require them to employ the “utmost,” “highest,” or “greatest” degree of care (Meck).
The case. A new operator, still in training, was driving a public bus with a line instructor standing behind him. A passenger boarded and took hold of a hanging strap. As the bus began to pull away from a stop, another passenger shouted “Back door!”, and at just under five miles per hour the operator made an abrupt stop. The passenger fell forward into a partition and later had surgery for a herniated disc in the neck. The transit authority argued that a government cannot be a common carrier. In 2020 the Supreme Court of Texas disagreed and held that the authority “is a common carrier that owes its passengers the duty to exercise a high degree of care,” and it affirmed the judgment for the passenger.
The government. Texas law makes a metropolitan rapid transit authority a governmental unit under the Tort Claims Act (Transportation Code Section 451.052(c)), so a claim against one runs through that Act. The Act waives immunity when an injury is caused by an employee’s negligence within the scope of employment, arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle, and the employee would be personally liable under Texas law (Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 101.021). In Meck the Court held that the Act’s word negligence “includes ‘slight negligence’ when the common law imposes” the high duty, so “the Tort Claims Act waives governmental immunity for the negligence of common carriers under the high-degree-of-care duty when that duty applies to them.” The Act’s limits come with it: the trial court in Meck applied the Act’s cap on damages (Section 101.023), and a claim must be noticed within six months unless the governmental unit already had actual notice of the injury (Section 101.101; see Notice and The One Door).
The other view. The transit authority asked the Court to overrule its precedent and hold that carriers owe only ordinary care. The majority declined to take that up in this case, because applying the ordinary negligence duty would not have changed the outcome. A concurring opinion for four of the nine justices called the high-degree-of-care rule “an anachronism that Texas should abandon.” The rule stood, and so did the judgment.
The move. In a bus case, name the standard early, in the pleadings and in the charge, and build the proof so it would meet ordinary care too, as the evidence did in Meck. The question is not only whether the operator drove the way any driver should. It is whether the operator acted as a very cautious and prudent person would have, with passengers standing, holding straps or still finding a seat. When the carrier is a public authority, the six-month notice runs from the day of the incident.
Common carrier is two words that set one standard: more care than an ordinary driver owes, owed to the people who handed over the wheel when they paid the fare.
VIA Metropolitan Transit v. Meck, No. 18-0458 (Tex. June 26, 2020), as posted by FindLaw; Tex. Transp. Code § 451.052, as posted on texas.public.law (verified May 26, 2025); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021, § 101.023 and § 101.101 (FindLaw, current as of January 1, 2026). General information, not legal advice. Texts as published at the time of this publication.