Benitez De Chavez v. UPS

A widow’s suit over her husband’s death, filed in a Texas court, removed to federal court, dismissed and refiled with a Texas company added, removed again, and sent back by the federal court on its own motion six days later. The appeal is about three words: resides, citizen and sua sponte.

The rule

A federal court can hear a state-law case only when the parties are citizens of different states and enough money is at stake, and the opinion opens on the distinction the whole case turns on: “Federal diversity jurisdiction turns on citizenship, not residency. One can reside in a state without being a citizen of that state, and vice versa. So if residency is insufficient to prove citizenship, then it’s also insufficient to establish federal diversity jurisdiction.” Citizenship means domicile, and “Domicile requires residence in [a] state and an intent to remain in the state,” so “residence is only part of the evidence necessary to establish domicile.” At the start of a case, though, the pleading does not have to be proof: “allegations [of citizenship] based on information and belief may establish jurisdiction,” and “While such allegations are not always sufficient, they may be sufficient” “‘in the nascency of litigation.’” The second rule is about who may send a case back. By statute, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise,” but the Fifth Circuit has long read the remand statute to preclude “the existence of discretion” “in the district court to remand for procedural defects on its own motion,” and a procedural defect is “‘any defect that does not go to the question of whether the case originally could have been brought in federal district court’” (Benitez De Chavez v. UPS, slip op. at 1 to 3, 5, 7).

The facts

The widow sued “following the tragic death of her husband,” individually and as administrator of his estate, with two other plaintiffs, in Texas state court against four companies. One of them removed the case to federal court on diversity, and the family voluntarily dismissed. The family refiled in state court against the same four defendants and a fifth, “a Texas company.” The package carrier removed again, claiming complete diversity; the family argued that the Texas company defeated it; the carrier answered that the Texas company “was improperly joined as a defendant, and thus should not be counted for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction.” The district court never reached that question. On its own motion, six days after the notice of removal, it remanded the case because the carrier “had failed to establish Plaintiffs’ Texas citizenship”: the petition said the plaintiffs “reside” in Texas, residency is not citizenship, and the court sent the case back “without giving UPS an opportunity to cure the jurisdictional deficiency” (slip op. at 4 to 5, 7).

The holding

Vacated. First, the court held it could hear the appeal at all, because the remand order “was based, not on a determination of subject matter jurisdiction, but on a deficiency in UPS’s pleading in its notice of removal,” and “under our decision in Allstate, that’s a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one.” “The district court did not find record evidence that negated the existence of diversity jurisdiction”; it found the allegations “simply insufficient to demonstrate diversity jurisdiction,” and a district court may not remand for that on its own motion. Second, on the merits, “We are not persuaded that UPS made the egregious error suggested by the district court.” The notice of removal had alleged, “[u]pon information and belief,” that the plaintiffs were domiciled in and citizens of Texas or El Salvador; “Its notice of removal demonstrates that UPS knew what it was required to allege,” and “As our precedent indicates, that is likely enough at this stage.” The court sent the case back with the real question still open: “The district court should consider the parties’ fraudulent joinder arguments in the first instance on remand.” And it closed with a warning to the bar: “The mistake that counsel made here could have been fatal to Defendant’s choice of forum. Had Plaintiffs moved for remand, we would be barred from reviewing the remand order under § 1447(d). But the district court acted sua sponte. And it turns out that, fortunately for UPS, that’s enough” “to avoid the bar on appellate review that § 1447(d) would otherwise impose.” “So when it comes to pleading diversity jurisdiction, lawyers should be careful to plead diversity of citizenship,” “not residency.” “We vacate the remand order and remand this case for further proceedings” (slip op. at 4 to 8).

Why it matters

This is a procedure case, and the family’s claim has not been decided; the opinion says nothing about how the man died or who is responsible. It matters to families anyway, for three reasons. First, where a death case is tried is not a formality. A Texas state court and a federal court in Texas apply the same Texas law to the claim, but, as a general matter, the juries are drawn differently, the judges and the rules differ, and a defendant that removes a case has decided that the federal courthouse is better for it. The fight over removal is the first fight in the case, and this opinion shows how it is won and lost: on the words in the first pleadings. A petition that says the family “resides” in Texas gave the federal court only part of what it needed; a notice that alleged citizenship on information and belief was likely enough at that stage. Second, the opinion is a map for the family’s side as much as the defendant’s. The remand here was undone because no one asked for it; the court said in so many words that if the family had moved to remand, the appeal would have been barred. A family that wants its case back in the county where the death happened asks for it, in a motion, and does not wait for the judge to notice. Third, the question that will decide the forum is still open: whether the Texas company was properly in the case. Adding a local defendant is a legitimate move when the facts support a claim against it, and the way to make it hold is to plead that claim with facts, the same lesson Liberty Mutual v. North Tarrant teaches about an insurer reading a petition. The clock on a death case is the subject of Limitations; the people who may bring it, of Wrongful Death; and the records a removal fight does not pause, of Spoliation.

One caution. The opinion decides where the case will be heard, for now, and nothing else. The family’s claims, the Texas company’s role, and the facts of the death were not before the court.

Benitez De Chavez v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 25-11146 (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 2026) (Ho, J., joined by Stewart and Higginson, JJ.; published), from the Northern District of Texas, No. 3:25-CV-2399. Every quotation above is from the slip opinion at the pages given; the plaintiffs are named in the caption and referred to here by role, and the defendants by role; the opinion does not say how the two other plaintiffs are related to the man who died. The cases the court quotes for the domicile rule, the information-and-belief rule and the Allstate rule are cited in the opinion and not read here. This is general information, not legal advice.